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Objective or Perception-Based?
A Debate on the Ideal Measure of 
Corruption*
Riccardo Pelizzo,† Omer Baris††
& Saltanat Janenova†††
In Kazakhstan, several institutions have developed new measures of 
corruption.  This Article addresses the doubts that empirical analyses have 
raised as to whether and to what extent existing measures of corruption 
provide valid and reliable estimates of corruption levels in Kazakhstan. 
Domestic institutions decided to develop the new measures after exploring 
reasons international measures seemed to be failing to provide a proper 
assessment of corruption in the country, with the hope that they could 
generate better estimates of corruption levels across different regions, sectors, 
and time.
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Introduction
Kazakhstan, usually regarded as a country plagued by high levels of 
corruption, has recently adopted several legislative and non-legislative 
measures to address the problem and hopefully to curb corruption.  In order 
to assess the effectiveness of the anticorruption policies, several 
institutions—from the Institute of Public Policy of the Nur Otan party to the 
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University–Cornell Law School Symposium on February 19, 2016 at Cornell Law School. 
The authors would like to thank the conference participants, particularly Professors 
Charles K. Whitehead and Dennis de Tray, for their valuable comments, as well as the 
editors of the Cornell International Law Journal for their editing work.
† Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev 
University, Kazakhstan; e-mail: Riccardo.Pelizzo@nu.edu.kz.
†† Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev 
University, Kazakhstan; e-mail: omer.baris@nu.edu.kz.
††† Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev 
University, Kazakhstan; e-mail: saltanat.janenova@nu.edu.kz.
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 43 Side B      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 43 Side B      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
PELIZZO ET AL. FORMATTED (4-6-17) 6/28/2017 5:01 PM
78 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50
former Academy of Financial Police of the Republic of Kazakhstan—have 
attempted to conceive, develop, and apply various methodologies to estimate 
the level of corruption across sectors and over time in Kazakhstan.1  By 
developing and applying these newly conceived measures of corruption, 
policy makers hoped to achieve three basic results: 1) to assess whether and 
to what extent anti-corruption policies generated the expected results and 
contributed to the reduction of corruption in the country; 2) to develop a better 
understanding of the areas/sectors in which anti-corruption policies have been 
more effective in reducing corruption; and 3) to identify areas/sectors where 
it is harder to eradicate or at least reduce the level of corruption and where 
greater efforts are needed.2
The search for a new index of corruption has generated a vibrant debate 
among Kazakhstani policy makers, methodologists, sociologists, and 
criminologists.  The debate is centered on whether it would be better to design 
a new subjective, perception-based index of corruption, or an objective, fact-
based index of corruption.3 In the course of this debate, the former Academy 
of Financial Police opted in favor of designing, developing, adopting, and 
using an objective, fact-based index, for the reasons that we will discuss in 
greater detail later on, while the Nur Otan Party’s Public Policy Institute 
(“NOPPI”) decided instead to develop a new subjective measure of 
corruption.4
This Article presents the indexes created by the former Academy of 
Financial Police and by the NOPPI for three reasons.  Firstly, the indexes 
represent interesting methodological contributions that address the broad 
question of how measures of corruption can be developed. Secondly, the 
indexes reflect the current intellectual debate that is now emerging on 
corruption and governance issues in Kazakhstan.  And thirdly, the indexes 
will be useful in the future to assess the validity of other measures and to 
enable analysts to distinguish the portion of the variance in the level of 
perceived corruption that is explained by changes in objective, fact-based 
conditions from the portion of the variance that is explained by other factors.
1. The “Nur Otan” Democratic People’s Party (from the Kazakh “Radiant 
Fatherland”) is the ruling party in Kazakhstan and headed by the President of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev.  The Academy of Financial Police of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan was abolished following the re-organization of the government bodies. 
Ashat Nijazov, On Reforming Public Administration System, KAZPRAVDA (Aug. 6, 2004, 
11:21 AM), http://www.kazpravda.kz/news/obshchestvo/akademiu-finansovoi-politsii-
likvidirovali-v-kazahstane/ [https://perma.cc/5CJN-5TAQ].
2. JANAR JANDOSOVA ET AL., SANGE RES. CTR. & U. N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN KAZAKHSTAN: BY PARLIAMENTARIANS, PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS, PRIVATE BUSINESS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 1, 4 (2003).
3. Press Release, Nur Otan Democratic People’s Party, Kazakhstan Developing 
Methodology of National Corruption Perception Index (Apr. 2, 2015), http://
old.nurotan.kz/en/news/8634 [https://perma.cc/4A4C-EGV3].
4. Information on the corruption measures developed by Kazakhstani stakeholders 
is based on extensive collaboration of the authors with the senior management and mid-
level management of the Civil Service and Anti-Corruption Agency, the former Academy 
of Financial Police, and the Public Policy Institute of the Nur Otan Party from 2014 to 
2016.
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This Article is divided into five sections. In the first section, this Article 
provides a brief overview of why corruption matters and how it has been 
assessed in the past, paying attention to the fact that while some efforts have 
been made to generate fact-based or objective measures of corruption, the 
best-known measures of corruption are subjective or perception-based. In the 
course of the discussion, we try to present the main advantages and 
disadvantages of each of the methodologies.
After a brief review of the related literature in the second section, this 
Article presents the data collected from a variety of global datasets in the third 
section.  In doing so, we demonstrate that no matter how the level of 
corruption is estimated, Kazakhstan is generally regarded as a highly corrupt 
polity.5 Building on this discussion, we perform some correlation analyses 
that raise questions about the validity and the reliability of the estimated 
corruption level in Kazakhstan.  We find that the levels of corruption 
estimated by the Corruption Perception Index (“CPI”), the World Governance 
Indicators (“WGI”), and the Global Competitiveness Index (“GCI”) are 
weakly and insignificantly related to one another and are fairly unstable over 
time.
In the fourth section, this Article explores three explanations for why 
international measures of corruption are unable to assess and track the 
changes in the level of corruption in Kazakhstan.  In doing so, we suggest that 
this anomaly can be explained on the basis of three different reasons, namely 
that Kazakhstan is so different from any other place that methodologies that 
work elsewhere do not work in the Kazakhstani context, that the 
methodologies employed to estimate the level of corruption are wrong, and 
that the information processed to estimate corruption levels in Kazakhstan is 
misleading.  After reviewing the evidence in favor of and against each of 
these explanations, we conclude that the most compelling explanation for 
why international measures do not work well in the case of Kazakhstan is that 
the measures rely on misleading information.  This finding is important 
because it can drive various institutional actors to gather better information 
to generate better estimates of corruption levels.
In the fifth section, this Article presents the three methodologies devised 
by institutional actors in Kazakhstan to measure corruption.  The Article 
evaluates the merits and possible shortcomings of each of them.  In the final 
section, the Article draws some tentative conclusions.
I. Related Literature
In the last few decades, corruption has been an increasingly popular topic 
in public policy research and other related areas of scientific analysis.  
Although scholars have yet to reach a consensus on the definition of 
corruption, scholarly research has focused on the causes and consequences of 
5. See Dossym Satpayev, Corruption in Kazakhstan and the Quality of Governance 
1–2 (Inst. for Developing Countries, Discussion Paper No. 475, 2014).
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corruption6 on both theoretical7 and empirical grounds.8 While the research 
on corruption was largely descriptive and theoretical at the earlier stages, this 
was mainly due to the nature of the topic and the difficulties in establishing 
an objective measurement for corruption and quantifying corruption-related 
activities.9 Empirical studies have flourished immensely, especially after the 
availability of wider datasets, and have extensively explored both the causes 
and the consequences of corruption.10  These studies have used different 
theoretical perspectives to examine the causes and effects of corruption.  In 
the case of Kazakhstan, researchers would focus narrowly on a particular 
aspect of corruption, such as rent-seeking behavior, and identify a wide range 
of factors that could be responsible for it.11 Such factors include the lack of 
democratic culture,12 a weak judicial system,13 the limited power of civil 
society,14 the “resource curse,”15 “political inertia,”16 contextual corruption,17
psychological effects of rapid ideological and economic transition, the local 
6. For an overall evaluation and summary of literature on corruption, see T. Aidt, 
Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey, 113 ECON. J. 632, 632–50 (2003).
7. See generally Kimberly Ann Elliott, Corruption as an International Policy 
Problem: Overview and Recommendations, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
175, 175–99 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).
8. Paulo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 695 (1995).
9. See Elliott, supra note 7, at 177.
10. Mauro, supra note 8.
11. See Oksan Bayulgen, Caspian Energy Wealth: Social Impacts and Implications 
for Regional Stability, in THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN CENTRAL ASIAN AND THE 
CAUCASUS: ENDURING LEGACIES AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 163, 164–79 (Amanda E. 
Wooden & Christoph H. Stefes eds., 2009).
12. On the relationship between corruption and the lack of democratic culture, see 
Adam Hug, Kazakhstan at a Crossroads: Governance, Corruption & International 
Investment, FOREIGN POL’Y CTR (2010); Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes of 
the International Corruption Regime and Indigenous Perception of Corruption in 
Kazakhstan, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 863, 876 (2001).
13. On the relationship between corruption and the weakness of the judicial system, 
see S. V. Simonov, Retrospektivnyj analiz rassmotreniya terminov “korruptsiya” i
“korruptsionnaya deyatel’nost” v Kazakhstane” [Retrospective Analysis of the 
Consideration of the Terms “Corruption” and “Corrupt Activity” in Kazakhstan], 54 
PRAVOVAYA REFORMA V KAZ. [LEG. REFORM KAZ.] 59, 59–64 (2011), http://
online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=31094981#pos=0;0 [https://perma.cc/HRT4-Z398]; 
Gaukhar Kaliyeva, Conference Report, Corruption Onset in the Nineteenth Century in 
Kazakhstan, CBU INT’L CONF. ON INTEGRATION & INNOVATION IN SCI. & EDUC. 125, 126 
(Apr. 7, 2013), http://ojs.journals.cz/index.php/CBUConference2013/article/view/24/27
[https://perma.cc/7HLZ-VP5T].
14. See JANDOSOVA ET AL., supra note 2 (describing the relationship between 
corruption and the limited power of civil society).
15. Bayulgen, supra note 11, at 173 (discussing how the resource curse relates to 
corruption).
16. See Colin Knox, Kazakhstan: Modernizing Government in the Context of Political 
Inertia, 74 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 477, 479 (2008) (describing the relationship between 
political inertia and corruption).
17. See Gjalt De Graaf, Causes of Corruption: Towards a Contextual Theory of 
Corruption, 31 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 39, 41 (2007); Bruce J. Perlman & Gregory Gleason, 
Cultural Determinism versus Administrative Logic: Asian Values and Administrative 
Reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 30 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1327, 1328 (2007).
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population’s high level of tolerance for corruption,18 and the limited access 
to information on public services.19
The need to identify the causes, the consequences, and the possible
developmental costs of corruption has generated a rich methodological debate 
on how corruption can be best assessed.  One stream of research has devised 
objective measures that look at the actual activities related to corruption and 
is more reliable when the data is available.20  The other stream of research 
has developed subjective, perception-based measures of corruption (such as 
the CPI by the Transparency International) whose emergence has made a 
significant contribution to the empirical research on corruption.
Neither objective nor subjective measures are perfect.  Objective 
measurements appear ideal, but they are difficult to obtain, and above all, they 
make cross-country comparison problematic since corruption has different 
definitions and meanings in different countries, legal traditions, and cultures.  
Survey-based subjective measures have some intrinsic problems as they rely 
on perceptions rather than objective facts, and they are often calculated 
through a collection of other surveys.21 Furthermore, they often fail to reflect 
the details of country-specific conditions, anti-corruption strategies, and 
implementation of these strategies.22 Additionally, aside from region-specific 
sources of measurement errors, perception-based measures are hardly 
comparable across time even for the same country,23 suggesting that more 
research is needed to identify country-specific conditions and more 
appropriate country-level corruption indicators.24 Finally, subjective 
18. See Tamara G. Nezhina, Examining the Causes of Systemic Corruption: The Case 
of Kazakhstan, (Nat’l Res. U. Higher Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 23, 2014) 
(describing the psychological effects of rapid ideological and economic transition and high 
level of tolerance of corruption by the local population).
19. See Saltanat Janenova & Pan Suk Kim, Innovating Public Service Delivery in 
Transitional Countries: The Case of One Stop Shops in Kazakhstan, 39 INT’L J. PUB.
ADMIN. 323, 326 (2016) (describing the relationship between limited access to information 
on public services and corruption).
20. See U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, E-GOVERNMENT SURVEY 2014: E-
GOVERNMENT FOR THE FUTURE WE WANT, at 2–3, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/188, 
U.N. Sales No. 14.II.H.1 (2014); see also Raymond Fisman & Roberta Gatti, 
Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 325, 326 
(2002); Edward L. Glaeser & Raven E. Saks, Corruption in America, 90 J. PUB. ECON.
1053, 1054–55 (2006); Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, Corruption and Government 
Size: A Disaggregated Analysis, 97 PUB. CHOICE 107, 108–09 (1998); Miriam A. Golden 
& Lucio Picci, Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption Illustrated with Italian Data,
17 ECON. & POL. 37, 37 (2005); Benjamin A. Olken, Corruption and the Costs of 
Redistribution: Micro Evidence from Indonesia, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 853, 853 (2006);
Benjamin A. Olken, Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in 
Indonesia, 115 J. POL. ECON. 200, 201 (2007).
21. ANJA ROHWER, IFO INST. FOR ECON. RES. U. MUNICH, MEASURING CORRUPTION:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL’S CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTIONS INDEX AND THE WORLD BANK’S WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 42–
43 (2009).
22. See Mitchell A. Seligson, The Measurement and Impact of Corruption 
Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America, 34 WORLD DEV. 381, 383 (2006).
23. See ROHWER, supra note 21, at 43.
24. See Stephen Knack, Measuring Corruption: A Critique of Indicators in Eastern 
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measures suffer from an additional critical weakness: they have or may have 
systematic bias.25  They measure corruption more accurately in countries 
where more data is available from a wider range of sources, such as in the 
developed world.26 In developing or less-developed countries, the indexes 
are based on a smaller number of less reliable sources.27 As a result, 
subjective measures measure corruption more accurately when corruption is 
less prevalent and they are less reliable where they are needed the most.28 At 
the same time, both the exact definition and the measurement of corruption, 
and differences due to country-specific factors (such as culture, tradition, 
etc.), still pose a challenge for researchers.  Due to these limitations, 
researchers came up with a comparative studies analysis that is more
meaningful for high-income countries than for low and middle-income 
countries.  In other words, corruption estimates, that are quite precise in high-
income countries, often have problems in terms of validity and reliability in 
developing countries.29 In spite of the fact that scholars and practitioners have 
been aware of the shortcomings of these measures and the need for better 
measures, these perception-based estimates of corruption have been widely 
employed because it is generally believed that bad data is better than no 
data.30
Efforts have, however, been made to cope, if not solve, some of the 
above-mentioned methodological problems.  For instance, a new subjective 
or perception-based assessment of corruption was developed by asking 
respondents to indicate whether they had had direct experience of corruption 
(like the International Crime Victims Survey) instead of asking them to 
indicate how much corruption they believed existed in their respective 
countries.31 Interestingly, Gutman demonstrated that the results of 
experience-based surveys do not correlate with those of perception-based 
Europe and Central Asia, 27 J. PUB. POL’Y 255, 256 (2007).
25. See ROHWER, supra note 21, at 43.
26. See Golden & Picci, supra note 20, at 39.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 40; see also Marcus J. Kurtz & Andrew Schrank, Growth and 
Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms, 69 J. POL. 538, 542 (2007).
29. Furthermore, as detailed by Kaufmann et al. in response to a number of 
methodological criticisms, for these indexes to report meaningful differences between 
countries, the confidence intervals for the scores of these countries should not overlap.  
Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance 
Indicators 1996–2008, at 2 (WBG Dev. Res. Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 
729, 2009), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/govind.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VE9E-SS2K].  Statistically, this condition is rarely met, if not completely 
overlooked.  Id. at 17–18.
30. See Carmelo J. Leon, Correcting for Scale Perception Bias in Measuring 
Corruption: An Application to Chile and Spain, 114 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 977, 978 
(2013); see also Staffan Andersson & Paul M. Heywood, The Politics of Perception: Use 
and Abuse of Transparency International’s Approach to Measuring Corruption, 57 POL.
STUD. 746, 754–57 (2009).
31. Jerg Gutmann et al., Perception vs. Experience Explaining Differences in 
Corruption Measures Using Microdata 2 (Sept. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=2659349 [https://perma.cc/2TDA-BJ3Q].
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surveys and found that corruption perceptions are biased due to respondent 
characteristics and country characteristics.32 As a result, estimates of the level 
of corruption in a given country are not always precise, efficient, valid, or 
reliable—a problem that has been documented for several countries and that 
undermines policy makers’ ability to assess whether and to what extent the 
anti-corruption policies that they design and implement are effective in 
curbing corruption.33
II. Corruption Measures for Kazakhstan
The case of Kazakhstan is rather interesting in this regard.  Kazakhstan 
is a young nation that became independent with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  It has experienced a high rate of economic growth for nearly two 
decades and has set forth, in several strategic documents, rather ambitious 
economic and developmental objectives.34  The Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy, 
for example, indicated that Kazakhstan’s objective is to become one of the 
thirty developed countries in the world by 2050.35 The Kazakhstan-2050
Strategy also made clear that this ambitious developmental goal should be 
achieved by improving the levels of education and public health, by 
diversifying the economy, by promoting good governance through proper 
institutional and administrative reforms, by attracting foreign direct 
investments, and by curbing corruption.36
Given the importance of reducing corruption, Kazakhstani policy makers 
need precise analytical tools to track the level of corruption across regions, 
across sectors, and over time.  Yet, as we will show in the rest of this section, 
some of the best-known international measures of corruption not only fail to 
provide any indication of corruption levels across regions and sectors, but 
often fail to provide proper nation-wide estimates of corruption that could be 
used in diachronic analyses.
The best-known international measures of corruption are the CPI by 
Transparency International, Control of Corruption by the WGI, and the 
Global Competitiveness Index’s estimates of diversion of public funds, 
irregular payments and bribes, and favoritism in decisions of government 
officials.37
32. Id. at 1.
33. See generally id. at 1, 3.
34. EURASIAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFF., KAZAKHSTAN’S GROWING ECONOMY 3
(2015), http://ecfaenglish.objects.dreamhost.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ECFA-
Occasional-Paper-Kazakhstans-Growing-Economy.pdf?dm_i=25TR,3AUY5,FNWMR4,
BTCHA,1 [https://perma.cc/6M32-PGKF].
35. Nursultan Nazarbayev, President, Kaz., Address in Astana: Strategy Kazakhstan 
2050–New Political Course of the Established State (Dec. 14, 2012), http://
www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/address-by-the-president-of-the-
republic-of-kazakhstan-leader-of-the-nation-nnazarbayev-strategy-kazakhstan-2050-
new-political-course-of-the-established-state [https://perma.cc/X9MD-ZE9A].
36. See generally KAZAKHSTAN 2050: TOWARD A MODERN SOCIETY FOR ALL (Aktoty 
Aitzhanova et al. eds., 2014).
37. RAYMOND JUNE ET AL., U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, A USER’S GUIDE TO MEASURING 
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The CPI is computed by aggregating the data collected from twelve data 
sources.  It has been expressed on a ten-point scale from its creation until 
2011, and on a 100-point scale from 2012 onwards.38 Low values indicate 
high levels of, or total, corruption, while high values indicate low levels, or 
absence, of corruption.39
The second measure of corruption that is widely used internationally is 
represented by the Control of Corruption variable.40 This variable is one of 
the six dimensions of governance included in the WGI.41 It has been 
computed from 1996 onward (except in 1997, 1999, and 2001), and it ranges 
from a minimum of -2.5 to a maximum of +2.5.42 Positive scores indicate a 
considerable ability to curb corruption and a corresponding low level of 
corruption. Negative scores indicate that there is little, if any, ability to 
control corruption.43
The third, fourth, and fifth measures of corruption used in the course of 
the present analyses are represented respectively by diversion of public funds, 
irregular payments and bribes, and favoritism in decisions of government 
officials.44 Two of these variables have been used in the computation of the 
Global Competitiveness Index since 2006–2007 and have been included in 
the GCI’s Historical Dataset from that year onward.  The variable concerning 
irregular payments and bribes has been computed, used, and included in the 
GCI’s Historical Dataset from 2011 onward.45 Each of these three 
CORRUPTION 6, 8, 10 (2008), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/
publications/democratic-governance/dg-publications-for-website/a-users-guide-to-
measuring-corruption/users_guide_measuring_corruption.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM2E-
BWYX]; KLAUS SCHWAB ET AL., WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
REPORT 2016–2017, at 39 (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2016-2017/
05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2016-2017_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc
/TR6U-YR33] [hereinafter SCHWAB ET AL. (2016–2017 REPORT)].
38. Corruption Perceptions Index: Frequently Asked Questions, TRANSPARENCY 
INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/in_detail [https://perma.cc/P4YS-AJFU]
(last visited Mar. 25, 2017); Frequently Asked Questions About the Corruption 
Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail 
[https://perma.cc/5KRH-ACDD] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).
39. Frequently Asked Questions About the Corruption Perceptions Index, supra note 
38.
40. JUNE ET AL., supra note 37, at 6.
41. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Home, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://info.
worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home [perma.cc/H77X-TXZ2] (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2016).
42. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Interactive Data Access, WORLD BANK 
GROUP, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports [perma.cc/T48F-
AYEC] (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
43. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Documentation, WORLD BANK GROUP, http:/
/info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc [perma.cc/TGU8-E8KR] (last
visited Nov. 8, 2016).
44. See generally SCHWAB ET AL. (2016–2017 REPORT), supra note 37.
45. KLAUS SCHWAB ET AL., WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 
2006–2007, at 48 (2006) (showing that two of the indicators were used as early as the 
2006–2007 report); KLAUS SCHWAB ET AL., WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009–2010, at 45 (2009) (incorporating various indicators, but 
not the indicator of irregular payments and bribes); KLAUS SCHWAB ET AL., WORLD ECON.
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corruption-related variables is expressed on a seven-point scale where the 
highest score means “best” and the lowest score means “worst.”46
Table 1. Corruption Index for Kazakhstan
Value?
CPI? 26?
Control of corruption? -.90?
Diversion? 3.3?
Favoritism? 3.0?
Irregular payments and bribes? 4.1?
The data presented in Table 1 provides what appears to be, at face value, 
a rather coherent picture of the level of corruption in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan.  In fact, no matter how one measures corruption, the Republic of 
Kazakhstan seems to be characterized by high levels of corruption.  In 2013, 
Kazakhstan scored only 26 of the 100 points on the CPI, and was assigned a 
score of -0.90 in terms of Control of Corruption by the WGI.  In 2014 it was 
assigned a score of 3.0 in terms of favoritism in government decision by the 
GCI, 3.3 in terms of diversion of funds, and 4.1 in terms of irregular payments 
and bribes.47 If the cutoff point—that is, what separates corrupt polities from 
non-corrupt ones—is 50 for CPI, 0 for WGI, and 3.5 for favoritism, diversion 
of funds, and irregular payment and bribes, three indicators place Kazakhstan 
in the camp of the corrupt countries, while the remaining two indicators 
barely place Kazakhstan in the camp of the non-corrupt ones.  Hence, on the 
basis of these data, one could be legitimately tempted to conclude that 
corruption is a pervasive problem in Kazakhstan.
This conclusion would, in turn, be further corroborated by the fact that
the rankings generated on the basis of each of these indicators reveal that a 
large number of countries are or at least are believed to be less corrupt than 
Kazakhstan.  Specifically, 64 countries do better—that is, have less—than 
Kazakhstan in terms of diversion of funds and irregular payments and bribes, 
76 countries do better in terms of favoritism in government decision, 125 
countries do better in terms of CPI, and 166 countries do better in terms of 
F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2010–2011, at 45 (2010) (showing that 
irregular payments and bribes began to be incorporated in the index with the 2010–2011 
report).
46. SCHWAB ET AL. (2016–2017 REPORT), supra note 37, at 12.
47. KLAUS SCHWAB ET AL., WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 
2013–2014, at 235 (2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global
CompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDN4-JWP9].
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control of corruption.48
Table 2. Kazakhstan in the Global Corruption Rankings
Position Out of
Favoritism? 77? 144?
Diversion? 65? 144?
Bribes? 65? 144?
CPI? 126? 175?
Control of Corruption? 167? 209?
While these measures prima facie seem to depict a coherent picture—
that there is a lot of corruption in Kazakhstan, or at least more than in many 
other countries—the quantitative analyses of these variables reveal that the 
picture is much fuzzier than the data presented in Tables 1 and 2 indicate and 
that the various corruption measures discussed here may have problems with 
validity and reliability.  CPI, control of corruption, as well as the three indexes 
devised by the GCI are all believed to have some problems in terms of 
validity, reliability, and predictive power.
Table 3. Correlation (sig.)
CPI Control of 
Corruption
Diversion Favoritism Bribes
CPI 1 .056
(.857)
-.710
(.074)
-.267
(.562)
-.902
(.285)
Control of 
Corruption
1 .302
(.511)
-.185
(.692)
.254
(.836)
Diversion 1 .823**
(0.006)
.542
(.345)
Favoritism 1 .396
(.509)
Bribes 1
** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level
48. Id.
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The validity of each of these indexes can be tested by correlation 
analysis.49 Specifically, each of these measures is validated if the correlation 
with another measure of corruption yields a positive, strong, and statistically 
significant coefficient.50
The results of the correlation analyses, presented in Table 3, raise several 
doubts about the validity of these measures of corruption.  Only two of the 
fifteen correlation coefficients are strong, positive, and statistically 
significant.  Four of the remaining correlation coefficients are extremely 
weak, four of them are negative, and all of them fail to reach statistical 
significance.
The problems of validity are coupled with problems of reliability.  The 
analysis of the data series constructed for each of the six measures of 
corruption reveals that they are quite unstable and volatile.  Between 2000 
and 2013 the CPI scores changed on average by 11.6% a year, alternating 
from remarkable improvements in 2000, 2005, and 2009 to major setbacks in 
2002 and 2007.  Between 2002 and 2013, the WGI’s Control of Corruption 
scores changed on average by 6.1%, experiencing both major improvements, 
as in 2004 and 2010, and major deterioration in the ability to control 
corruption, as in 2003, 2005, and 2012.  It is remarkable that in 2005 when
the CPI reported an 18.2% improvement, the control of corruption scores 
dropped by nearly 9.1%.
In order to provide more compelling evidence about the 
reliability/unreliability of each of these six indexes, we can correlate the 
estimates generated in a given year with a given index with the estimates 
generated with the same index in a different year.  If the correlation analysis 
yields a positive, strong, and statistically significant coefficient, it 
demonstrates that the data is reliable.51 The result of the correlation analysis 
presented in Table 4 sustains the claim that the five measures of corruption 
used to compile the global dataset are not all terribly reliable.
The correlations between CPI scores in a given year with CPI scores in 
each of the previous years never yield statistically significant coefficients and 
in three cases out of six it generates a negative coefficient.  Hence, the results 
of the correlation analyses cast serious doubts as to whether CPI scores for 
Kazakhstan are reliable.  
By correlating WGI’s control of corruption score measured in a given 
year with the control of corruption scores for the previous years, we find that 
all correlation coefficients are positive but insignificant from a statistical 
point of view.  This evidence once again casts serious doubts about the 
reliability of these estimates for Kazakhstan.  
By correlating the scores pertaining to the diversion of funds in a given 
year with the scores for previous years, we find four of the six correlation 
coefficients are positive and relatively strong, but one is extremely weak and 
49. Karim Sadeghi, Doubts on the Validity of Correlation as a Validation Tool, 3 
LANGUAGE TESTING ASIA 1, 1 (2013).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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one is negative.  In other words, this statistical analysis does not provide much 
evidence in favor of the reliability of this data.  
The correlation of the scores of favoritism in a given year with scores 
generated in previous years never yield statistically significant coefficients 
and in three cases, the coefficient is negative.  
Finally, since the collection of data for the bribes variable began several 
years after the data for diversion and favoritism started to be collected, it is 
possible to correlate the scores generated in one year only with the scores 
generated in the previous year or two before.  Of the three correlation 
coefficients, two are positive and statistically insignificant while the third is 
significant but negative.  This evidence suggests that even this series of data 
has major problems in terms of reliability.
Table 4. Correlation (sig.)
CPI? CPI@T-1? CPI@T-2? CPI@T-3?
CPI? 1? .23
(.437)?
-.27
(.376)?
-.13
(.685)?
CPI@T-1? 1? .22
(.465)?
-.29
(.356)?
CPI@T-2? 1? .18
(.571)?
CPI@T-3? 1?
Control of 
corruption ?
Control of 
corruption@T-1?
Control of 
corruption@T-2?
Control of 
corruption@T-3?
Control of 
corruption ?
1? .41
(.205)?
.23
(.481)?
.24
(.501)?
Control of 
Corruption@T-1?
1? .37
(.297)?
.24
(.478)?
Control of 
Corruption@T-2?
1? .41
(.269)?
Control of 
Corruption@T-3?
1?
Diversion? Diversion@T-1? Diversion@T-2? Diversion@T-3?
Diversion? 1? .70
(.053)?
.01
(.980)?
-.76
(.082)?
Diversion@T-1? 1? .77
(.043)?
.18
(.726)?
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Diversion@T-2? 1? .81
(.049)?
Diversion @T-3? 1?
Favoritism? Favoritism@T-1? Favoritism@T-2? Favoritism@T-3?
Favoritism ? 1? .52
(.188)?
-.33
(.467)?
-.79
(.060)?
Favoritism@T-1? 1? .55
(.205)?
-.17
(.743)?
Favoritism@T-2? 1? .64
(.169)?
Favoritism@T-3? 1?
Bribes? Bribes@T-1? Bribes@T-2?
Bribes? 1? .30
(.704)?
-1.0
(.030)?
Bribes@T-1? 1? .48
(.679)?
Bribes@T-2? 1?
The results of the correlation analyses presented in Tables 3 and 4 
suggest a simple conclusion: that the corruption perception index, control of 
corruption, as well as the three GCI indexes appear to be somewhat 
problematic both in terms of validity and reliability.  This means that while 
these data can be employed to provide a general picture of the corruption level 
in Kazakhstan in a rather crude way—there is a lot of corruption—the data is 
remarkably less useful in precisely estimating how much corruption there 
actually is and in tracking how the level of corruption varies over time.
III. Three Explanations
Why do international measures of corruption fail to provide a precise 
assessment of the level of corruption in Kazakhstan?  There appears to be 
three possible answers for this question.  The first answer is that Kazakhstan 
is a somewhat exceptional case where a methodology, that is successfully 
used to estimate the level of corruption elsewhere, does not work.  The second 
answer is that international measures of corruption have some inherent 
methodological flaws and misrepresent the level of corruption in Kazakhstan.  
The third answer is that the methodologies employed to estimate levels of 
corruption are sound but the information/data that the methodologies employ 
to generate the scores is inaccurate.
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Thus, we have three basic explanations for why the international 
measures of corruption do not provide terribly valid and reliable estimates of 
the level of corruption in Kazakhstan.  In the remainder of this Article, we 
will critically examine the evidence in favor and against each of these 
explanations.
IV. Kazakhstan: Is it Exceptional?
There are several reasons why one could think that Kazakhstan may be 
a somewhat exceptional case.  Kazakhstan’s colonial legacy, Soviet rule, size, 
and economic success make it quite peculiar.  In the last decades, Kazakhstan 
has been engaged in a process of deep transformation, from a planned to a 
market-based economy and from a Soviet republic to a unitary, multiethnic 
sovereign state.52 It is the ninth largest country in the world, but it has one of 
the world’s lowest population densities.  Kazakhstan is at the cross-roads 
between the East and the West as it links the large and fast-growing markets 
of the People’s Republic of China and South Asia with the Russian Federation 
and Western Europe by road, rail, and ports on an internal sea (the Caspian
Sea).53 Furthermore, it has rich natural resources, particularly oil and gas 
reserves (the country ranks 12th in the world in terms of oil reserves and 19th 
for natural gas reserves), which attract an increasing flow of direct foreign 
investments.  For the most part of its post-Soviet history, it has experienced 
rapid economic growth.54 Finally, Kazakhstan managed to join the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 2010 and has more 
recently joined the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).55 Over the past 
decade, the country has made important policy strides, progressed towards 
developing a rule-driven fiscal framework, strengthened public management 
and its business climate, and allocated resources for improving social services 
and critical infrastructure to sustain growth.56
52. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV. [OECD], MULTI-DIMENSIONAL REVIEW OF 
KAZAKHSTAN: VOLUME 1. INITIAL ASSESSMENT 21 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/
publications/multi-dimensional-review-of-kazakhstan-9789264246768-en.htm [https://
perma.cc/DF4J-A7SL].
53. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV. [OECD], KAZAKHSTAN: REVIEW OF THE CENTRAL 
ADMINISTRATION 70–71 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/publications/kazakhstan-review-of-
the-central-administration-9789264224605-en.htm [https://perma.cc/7AZD-WSZP].
54. Id.
55. Press Release, World Trade Organization [WTO], Kazakhstan Joins the WTO as 
162nd Member, (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/
acc_kaz_30nov15_e.htm [https://perma.cc/282G-M6S9]; Saule Lukpanova, Kazakhstan 
and the OSCE: Development of Interaction, KAZ. INST. STRATEGIC STUD. (June 20, 2008), 
http://kisi.kz/en/categories/geopolitics-and-international-affairs/posts/kazakhstan-and-
osce-development-of-interaction [https://perma.cc/EA7G-CMHG].
56. WORLD BANK, COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY FOR THE PERIOD FY12–FY17
(Mar. 30, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/859761468272382244/pdf/
678760CAS0P1280Official0Use0Only090.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MM9-K8S2].
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Between 2000 and 2010, Kazakhstan saw significant improvements in 
social development indicators, including the Gender Inequality Index, which 
increased Kazakhstan’s score by more than 30% over a decade, and the 
Human Development Index, which ranked Kazakhstan 69th out of 
187 countries in 2012 (among some developed countries), an improvement 
from 80th place in 2005.57 These achievements and successes have been 
achieved in spite of the fact the country has been plagued, if international 
indicators are to be believed, by high levels of corruption.
However, analysts suggest that in spite of remarkable recent 
transformation, Kazakhstan is facing a number of challenges that undermine 
its sustainability and reputation.58  The challenges include growing regional 
disparities in wealth distribution, a persistently high poverty rate (particularly 
in rural areas), limited human capital, uneven implementation of the rule of 
law and democratic processes, limited citizen participation in policy 
processes, and excessive corruption.59 As such, implementing governance 
reforms to advance effective functioning of government institutions, 
strengthening the quality of democratic institutions and rule of law, and 
reducing corruption are critical for the country to implement its ambitious 
vision and objectives.60
Given this wide range of challenges, Kazakhstan has made and continues 
to make efforts to modernize the public sector and to make a wider use of 
information and communication technologies (“ICT”) for provision of 
services and inclusion.  This is evidenced by the launch of the One Stop Shop 
(“OSS”) (Public Service Centers), an innovative organization, which, since 
2004, has provided services of different government bodies at one location.61
For over a decade, access to information on public services has been 
significantly improved, and alternative service delivery channels have been 
introduced via face-to-face OSS, e-government, and mobile technologies.62
According to the 2014 United Nations E-Government Survey, Kazakhstan 
has improved its ratings from the 81st position in 2008 to the 28th position,
out of 192, in 2014.63 Conditions were created that allow for the citizens and 
businesses to report corrupt practices through call centers and blogs of the 
government bodies.64 In addition, adoption of the law, “On Public Services,”
57. OECD, KAZAKHSTAN: REVIEW OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53.
58. Id. at 46.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Janenova & Kim, supra note 19, at 323.
62. Id. at 329.
63. Id.
64. ??z??st?n Respublik?syny?? 2015–2025 Zhyld?r??? ?rn?l??n Syb????s
Zhem?orly???? ??rsy Str?tegi?? Asy [Anti-Corruption Strategy of Kazakhstan for 2015–
2025 Years], ??????????M???????????T??????????U??????????? [KARAGANDA STATE 
TECH. UNIV.] (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.kstu.kz/antikorruptsionnaya-strategiya-
respubliki-kazahstan-na-2015-2025-gody-2/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/3UE8-3UER].
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in 2013 led to the reduction of the number of permits and licenses for various 
business activities and has improved access to public services.65
More importantly, policy makers in the country have repeatedly 
indicated that fighting corruption is a priority.66 President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, upon ordering the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan before the end of 2014, made clear that “the state 
should create conditions under which it will be impossible to use official 
powers for personal gain.”67 The Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy defines 
“corruption” as a direct threat to national security, and appeals to the state 
and to society to collectively fight against this scourge.68
The Kazakhstani government authorities recognize the challenge of 
corruption and have taken major steps to develop measures for reducing the 
level of corruption in the public sector.69 Kazakhstan was one of the first 
countries among the CIS countries to adopt the “Law on Fighting Corruption”
in 1998 and the “Civil Service Law” in 1999.70 The explicit mandate to 
eliminate corruption was assigned to the Agency for Civil Service and
Fighting Corruption, which was created by merging the Civil Service Agency 
and the former Agency for Fighting Economic and Corruption Crimes during 
the reorganization of the government in August 2014.71 In December 2015, 
Kazakhstan established the new Ministry for Civil Service, which included 
the National Bureau for Anti-Corruption, and tasked it with the prevention, 
detection, suppression, and investigation of corruption offenses.72 In 
65. Memleket???? ????????????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ??????????
????????????? ???????????? ????????? ???????????? ??????????-????????? ???????? ???????
Information System of Regulatory Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan], 2013 
(Kaz.), translated at http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z1300000088 [https://perma.cc/BW9S-
WCFR].
66. Anti-corruption is an Important Strategic Priority in Kazakhstan’s Policy,
INFOZAKON, http://infozakon.com/news/corruption/1468-protivodeystvie-korrupcii-
yavlyaetsya-vazhneyshim-strategicheskim-prioritetom-politiki-kazahstana.html [https://
perma.cc/8FKW-YRVE] (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
67. President Charges to Adopt Anti-Corruption Strategy Until 2025 Before Year 
End, KAZINFORM (Sep. 2, 2016), http://inform.kz/eng/article/2692903 [https://perma.cc/
7MBF-JVLV].
68. Anti-Corruption Strategy of Kazakhstan for 2015–2025 Years, supra note 64.
69. See, e.g., id.; Legal Information System of Regulatory Legal Acts of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, supra note 65.
70. Anti-Corruption Program of the Nur Otan Party for 2015–2025, NUR OTAN 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S PARTY (Nov. 11, 2014), http://old.nurotan.kz/en/anti-corruption-
program-nur-otan-party-2015-2025 [https://perma.cc/SYS7-M2TV].
71. Sozdano Agentstvo po delam gossluzhby i protivodejstviju korrupcii, finpol 
uprazdnen, novoe vedomstvo vozglavit Kozhamzharov [Created by the Agency for Civil 
Service Affairs and Anti-Corruption, the Financial Police was Abolished, the New
Department will be Headed by Kozhamzharov], VLAST (Aug. 7, 2014), https://vlast.kz/
novosti/sozdano_agentstvo_po_delam_gossluzhby_i_protivodejstviju_korrupcii_finpol_
uprazdnen_novoe_vedomstvo_vozglavit_kozhamzharov-6767.html [https://perma.cc/
SV7W-8DZS].
72. Ukaz Glavy gosudarstva,  “Ob obrazovanii Ministerstva po delam 
gosudarstvennoj sluzhby Respubliki Kazahstan” [By the Presidential Decree “On the 
formation of the Ministry of Civil Service Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan”], 
AKORDA: OFFICIAL SITE OF THE PRESIDENT REPUBLIC OF KAZ. Dec. 11, 2015, No. 128 
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September 2016, the Ministry for Civil Service was reorganized back into the 
Agency for Civil Service and Anti-Corruption.73
In view of changing values and attitudes in the society, Kazakhstan 
introduced the new Ethics Code in December 2015 and replaced the former 
Code of Honor of Civil Servants of Kazakhstan.74  The new Code of Ethics 
extends the standards of conduct with situational conditions of activity of 
civil servants, and elaborates on the behavior of civil servants in cases of 
conflicts of interest.75
In January 2016, Kazakhstan introduced the new position of the Ethical 
Commissioner, in part to monitor the compliance of the government officials 
with the Ethics Code, as well as to support anti-corruption measures and 
education.76 The new Law on Civil Service adopted in November 2015 
introduced open and competitive civil service recruitment, competency-based 
career development, and a performance-based remuneration system.77  The 
Law on Civil Service aims to reduce conditions for protectionism, nepotism, 
and patronage in the civil service.78
The new Law on Fighting Corruption introduces a new vision of the 
corruption offenses defined by the authorized body in the field of anti-
corruption.79 The document discloses the concept of “corruption,” “anti-
corruption policy,” and “corruption risk,” and also introduces new anti-
corruption measures via anti-corruption restrictions and anti-corruption 
monitoring.80 Anti-corruption monitoring will be carried out by all actors 
(Kaz.), http://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/akorda_news/akorda_other_events/ukaz-glavy-
gosudarstva-ob-obrazovanii-ministerstva-po-delam-gosudarstvennoi-sluzhby-respubliki-
kazahstan [https://perma.cc/3WUZ-W8Q2].
73. See Decree on Reorganization of the Ministry for Civil Service Affairs of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, AKORDA: OFFICIAL SITE PRESIDENT REPUBLIC KAZ. Sept. 13, 
2016, No. 328 (Kaz.), http://www.akorda.kz/en/events/akorda_news/akorda_other_events
/decree-on-reorganization-of-the-ministry-for-civil-service-affairs-of-the-republic-of-
kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/Z5SB-BC73].
74. Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kaza?stan ot 29 dekabr?? a 2015 goda No. 153 O mera??
??? ????????????? ??????????????????? ?? ??????????? norm i pravil povedeni?? a
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????
of Kazakhstan of Dec. 29, 2015, No. 153: “On Measures for further improvement of ethics 
rules and behavior of the civil servants of the Republic of Kazakhstan”], Dec. 29, 2015, 
No. 153 (Kaz.), http://www.zakon.kz/4766805-utverzhden-jeticheskijj-kodeks.html
[https://perma.cc/US5Q-8FV9].
75. Id.
76. V Kaza?stane po?? avits?? a nova?? ?????????????????????????????????[The New Post of 
‘Ethical Commissioner’ will Appear in Kazakhstan], I-NEWS (Sept. 23, 2015) (Kaz.],
https://i-news.kz/news/2015/09/23/8130046-v_kazahstane_poyavitsya_novaya_
dolzhnost.html [https://perma.cc/W73G-SW7A].
77. ?????????????????????????????????????????????? [ZK RK] [On State Service of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan], Nov. 23, 2015, No. 416-V ZRK, ch. 1, arts. 1(1), 4(17), 4(19) 
(Kaz.), translated at http://anticorruption.gov.kz/eng/pravoprimenenie/zakony_rk/
?cid=0&page=1 [https://perma.cc/2TS8-JCKH].
78. See id. ch. 2, art. 13.
79. ??????????????????????up?? sii [ZK RK] [On Combating Corruption], Nov. 18, 2015, 
No. 410-V ZRK, ch. 1, art. 1(10) (Kaz.), translated at http://anticorruption.gov.kz/eng/
pravoprimenenie/zakony_rk/ [https://perma.cc/5URZ-HK7C].
80. Id. ch. 1, arts. 1 (6–8, 12); id. ch. 2, arts. 6–8.
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combating corruption, including the authorized body on anti-corruption and 
its territorial divisions, and public authorities.81 The results of the monitoring 
of anti-corruption are the basis for the analysis of corruption risks.82 The 
subject of the analysis is to identify corruption risks and the possibility of 
studying the causes and conditions conducive to the commission of offenses 
of corruption.  The law also reinforced the measure countering corruption as 
financial control by the declaration of natural persons, the declaration of 
assets and liabilities, and income of the property.83
The Anti-Corruption Programme for 2011–2015 states that “the most 
corrupted areas are . . . public procurement, use of mineral resources, land 
matters and construction, customs and taxation, where there has been a 
significant growth in the resulting damage over the recent years.”84 In his
address on January 27, 2012, President Nazarbayev instructed the 
Kazakhstani government to draft a new comprehensive anti-corruption 
program.85  The presidential address on January 17, 2014, “The way of 
Kazakhstan-2050,” emphasized that continued efforts to develop and 
implement a new anti-corruption strategy was an urgent priority.86
Kazakhstan developed two parallel anti-corruption programs following 
the President’s instruction: the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2015–2025,
developed by the Agency for Civil Service and Anti-Corruption in 
cooperation with the representatives of key government stakeholders and 
international experts87; and the Anti-Corruption Program of the Nur Otan 
Party for 2015–2025, developed in consultation with international experts and 
the public.88
81. See id. ch. 1, art. 1(10); id. ch. 2, art. 7; id. ch. 3, arts. 21–23.
82. Id. ch. 2, art. 7(4).
83. Id. ch. 2, art 11.
84. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV. [OECD], ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN 
KAZAKHSTAN: ROUND 3: MONITORING OF THE ISTANBUL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN 
17 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/Kazakhstan-Round-3-
Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/79ST-QKVN] (quoting the Resolution of 
the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 308: “On approving the Sectoral 
Programme for the Fight against Corruption in the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2011–
2015”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Nursultan Nazarbayev, President, Kaz., Address to the People of Kazakhstan: 
Socio-Economic Modernization as Main Vector of Development of Kazakhstan (Jan. 27, 
2012), http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/address-by-the-
president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayev-to-the-people-of-
kazakhstan-27-01-2012_1341926486 [https://perma.cc/8J53-JQ8E].
86. See Nursultan Nazarbayev, President, Kaz., Address to the People of Kazakhstan: 
Kazakhstan’s Way - 2050: Common Aim, Common Interests, Common Future (Jan. 17, 
2014), http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/address-of-the-
president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-nnazarbayev-to-the-nation-january-17-
2014-3 [https://perma.cc/UB5D-MLBC].
87. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV. [OECD], ISTANBUL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION 
PLAN, THIRD ROUND OF MONITORING: KAZAKHSTAN: PROGRESS UPDATES 4 (2015), https:/
/www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/Kazakhstan-ACN-Progress-Update-March-2015-
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA2G-4USA].
88. Anti-Corruption Program of the Nur Otan Party for 2015–2025, supra note 70.
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The key goals outlined by the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2015–2025 
are: 1) fighting corruption in civil service; 2) introducing a public monitoring 
institute; 3) reducing corruption in quasi-government and private sectors; 4) 
minimizing corruption in court and law enforcement bodies; 5) building anti-
corruption culture; and 6) developing international cooperation on the issues 
of fighting corruption.  The improvement of the country’s position in the 
international corruption ratings, including the CPI rating of Transparency 
International, is one of the key performance indicators of this program along 
with other indicators such as quality of public services, public trust to the 
government, and the level of legal literacy among the population.89
The Concept of Legal Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2010–
2020 calls for greater accountability for corrupt activities.90  The new 
Criminal Executive Code introduced a lifetime ban from civil service for 
persons who have committed crimes related to corruption.91 Anti-corruption 
legislation sets the norms for confiscation of property obtained by criminal 
means and imposes personal responsibility on the heads of the public 
organizations for anti-corruption cases that are within their organizations.92
Government officials are regularly trained in anti-corruption.93 The 
reputation of Astana EXPO-2017, the President’s effort to showcase the 
country to the world, was undermined by the corruption scandal involving 
some of its top managers.94 The former chairman, Talgat Yermegiyayev, of 
“Astana EXPO-2017,” embezzled approximately $22.4 million from the 
state-owned joint stock company.95 There have been many cases of top 
officials being convicted of corruption, including at the central level (in 
particular, the cases of the ex-Prime-Minister; the ex-chairmen of the 
Statistics and Antimonopoly Agencies; and the ex-vice-ministers of 
Agriculture, Defense, Education, and Environmental Protection) and regional 
level (in particular within the oil-rich area of Atyrau and Mangistau).  
89. OECD, ISTANBUL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN, THIRD ROUND OF 
MONITORING: KAZAKHSTAN: PROGRESS UPDATES, supra note 87.
90. Legal Policy Concept 2010-2020, GENERAL PROSECUTOR’S OFF. REPUBLIC KAZ.
(Sept. 2009), http://prokuror.gov.kz/eng/prosecutors/standard-legal-acts/legal-policy-
concept-2010-2020 [https://perma.cc/7XMP-92TF].
91. The Criminal Executive Code #226-V has been in force since 1 January 2015, 
available at http://prokuror.gov.kz/eng/state/new-codes/criminal-executive-code-
republic-kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/M9TY-CUA7].
92. Id.
93. OECD, ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN KAZAKHSTAN: ROUND 3: MONITORING OF 
THE ISTANBUL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN, supra note 84, at 76–77.
94. See Kazakhstan Jails International Expo Organiser for Corruption, INDOPREMIER
(June 9, 2016, 11:39 PM), https://www.indopremier.com/newsDetail
.php?jdl=Kazakhstan_jails_international_expo_organiser_for_corruption&news_id=11
60654&group_news=ALLNEWS&taging_subtype=ANCAMANTAPERINGTHEFED&
name=&search=y_general&q=rate,%20&halaman=1 [https://perma.cc/LG8D-7KR4].
95. Paolo Sorbello, EXPO in Kazahkstan: Nepotism and Corruption Revealed,
DIPLOMAT (July 22, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/expo-in-kazakhstan-
nepotism-and-corruption-unveiled/ [https://perma.cc/M5CQ-6GKZ].
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Nevertheless, there are some concerns that some of these measures were 
taken for political reasons.96
Punishments for corruption crimes were strengthened and the definition 
of a “government official” was extended to managers of companies in which 
the government holds more than a 35% stake under the Law on the Fight 
against Corruption in December 2009.97 Furthermore, whistleblower 
protection was reaffirmed, and punishment of state officials who failed to 
report corruption cases was introduced.98 Whistleblowers can access hotlines 
of different government bodies including the Agency of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on Civil Service and Fighting Corruption to anonymously report 
acts of corruption.99 However, in practice, whistleblowing is considered 
taboo and a breach of corporate loyalty.100
Although there have been several anti-corruption programs enacted 
since 2001,101 it is difficult to evaluate the effect of anti-corruption measures 
solely from the number of measures implemented, each of which have 
different impact weights on various areas.  Despite numerous anti-corruption 
measures, protectionism, nepotism, and business protection are still 
flourishing in Kazakhstan according to some analysts.102 On May 6, 2015, 
96. BHAVNA DAVE, FREEDOM HOUSE, KAZAKHSTAN COUNTRY REPORT 4 (2013), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/kazakhstan [perma.cc/7L7S-Z4Y8]
(“High-level officials [in Kazakhstan] typically only face charges after they have fallen 
out of favor with the regime.  In 2012, multiple administrators in Atyrau were sacked and 
investigated for misappropriating more than $100 million, and the country’s prosecutor 
general stepped in to dismiss the regional prosecutor for his slow-footed response to the 
scandal.  In addition, the regime continued to pursue corruption charges against former 
officials who have fled the country.”)
97. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Affairs, 2012 Investment Climate 
Statement: Kazakhstan (2012).
98. Id.; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Affairs, 2014 Investment Climate 
Statement: Kazakhstan 1, 18 (2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
229094.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH5D-456T].
99. OECD, KAZAKHSTAN: REVIEW OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53.
100. Id.
101. Law on Anticorruption Efforts, 1998, No. 267–1 (Kaz.); Sectoral Program of 
Anti-Corruption in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011–2015, Ministry of Justice of the 
Rep. of Kaz., Mar. 31, 2011, No. 308 (Kaz.), translated at http://www.adilet.gov.kz/en/
node/47917 [https://perma.cc/PJW4-25HU]; Report for Year 2015 on the Implementation 
of the Anti-Corruption Strategy Action Plan 2015–2017, Ministry of Justice of the Rep. of 
Kaz., Apr. 14, 2015, No. 234 (Kaz.); Asian Dev. Bank & OECD, ABD/OECD Anti-
Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, OECD (2001), https://www.oecd.org/
countries/kazakhstan/36784927.pdf; Asian Dev. Bank & OECD, ABD/OECD Anti-
Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, OECD (2006), www.oecd.org/countries/
philippines/36780320.pdf [https://perma.cc/7X9X-FEBV].
102. See, e.g., JANDOSOVA ET AL., supra note 2; see also Tamara G. Nezhina, 
Examining the Causes of Systematic Corruption: The Case of Kazakhstan 1, 23–24 (Nat’l
Research U. Higher Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. BRP 23/PA/2014, 2014), http://
www.hse.ru/data/2014/12/18/1103293053/23PA2014%20new.pdf [https://perma.cc/
62ZV-MZXM]; Natsuko Oka, Everyday Corruption in Kazakhstan: An Ethnographic 
Analysis of Informal Practices 1, 5–9 (Inst. of Dev. Econs. – Japan External Trade Org., 
Interim Report No. 2012-C-24, 2013), http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/
Report/2012/pdf/C24_ch1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VVZ-PSP5]; Dossym Satpayev, 
Corruption in Kazakhstan and the Quality of Governance 1–3 (Inst. of Dev. Econs.,
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the President announced the nation’s plan of “100 concrete steps to 
implement five institutional reforms” which includes “ensuring the rule of 
law” and “transparency and accountability of the state” among key priority 
areas.103  Several steps are aimed to strengthen the fight against corruption 
such as the implementation of new standards through the development of a 
civil service code of ethics overseen by a special commissioner; 
establishment of a special unit in the Agency dealing with systemic 
prevention and measures against corruption; adoption of a new Civil Service 
Law which will be applicable to employees of all state agencies, including 
law enforcement bodies; and comprehensive performance reviews of all civil 
servants combined with a new result-based payment system.104
In light of the foregoing, it should be clear that Kazakhstan is a very 
complex case.  It is very unique, and one could argue that the reason why 
international measures do not seem to do a great job at tracking corruption in 
the country is simply because Kazakhstan’s combination of history, legacy, 
economic success, and reforms is truly exceptional.
If Kazakhstan’s exceptionalism were the reason why the international 
measures of corruption fail to provide valid and reliable estimates of how 
much corruption there is in the country, then the international measures 
should provide valid and reliable estimates of corruption levels in other 
jurisdictions.
V. Faulty Method or Faulty Data?
Analysis of the data shows that international measures of corruption can 
also be problematic in other national settings both in terms of validity and 
reliability.
With regard to the validity, the results of our correlation analyses reveal 
that the corruption levels estimated by the basis of CPI are only weakly and 
insignificantly related to corruption levels measured on the basis of the 
Control of Corruption Variable computed by the WGI.
As previously discussed, the problem of the validity of the corruption 
estimates can be observed in the case of Kazakhstan and in other successor 
states (Russia, Uzbekistan), but it can also be detected in countries with 
different legacies such as the Gambia and Ghana.
The correlation analysis reveals that, though properly signed, the 
correlation between CPI and Control of Corruption estimates failed to yield 
statistically significant coefficients with the exception of Moldova and 
Indonesia—which are the only cases in which these corruption scores are 
cross-validated.
Discussion Paper No. 475, 2014), http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/
pdf/475.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PQ5-JFU9].
103. 100 Concrete Steps to Implement Five Institutional Reforms, EMBASSY REP. OF 
KAZ. (May 6, 2015), http://www.kazakhembus.com/content/100-concrete-steps-
implement-5-institutional-reforms [https://perma.cc/K3L3-8LN7].
104. Id.
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Table 5. Correlations (sig.)
CPI
The 
Gambia
Ghana Moldova Russia Uzbekistan Indonesia
Control of 
Corruption
The 
Gambia
.399
(.224)
Ghana .292
(.332)
Moldova .610
(.027)
Russia .466
(.109)
Uzbekistan .527
(.064)
Indonesia .700
(.008)
With regard to the reliability of the data, the results of the correlation 
analysis presented in Table 5 make it quite clear that CPI estimates are 
somewhat unreliable in the Russian case, where three of the six correlation 
coefficients fail to reach statistical significance, and they are very unreliable 
in Moldova where all the correlation coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. While the unreliability of CPI estimates in Kazakhstan, Russia, 
and Uzbekistan—all of which are successor states—could lead one to believe 
that the problems that CPI estimates confront in the post-Soviet countries may 
be due to a common, regional effect, the fact that the CPI estimates are very 
unreliable in the Gambia indicates that the reliability problems affecting CPI 
estimates are not the result of a regional effect but rather (1) faulty 
methodologies in generating such estimates of corruption levels105 or (2) bad 
data despite good methodologies.
If CPI estimates were unreliable in each country in the world, their global 
unreliability could sustain the claim for faulty methodology.  Although CPI 
estimates are unreliable in the case of Kazakhstan, Gambia, Moldova, and, to 
a lesser extent, Russia, there are several other cases in which CPI estimates 
105. Knack, supra note 24, at 264.
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are very reliable and stable over time.106 The results of the correlation 
analyses presented in Table 6 reveal, in fact, that CPI estimates can be highly 
reliable both in countries with a Soviet legacy, such as Uzbekistan, as well as 
in countries, such as Ghana or Indonesia, that do not have such a legacy.
More importantly, the fact that CPI estimates are highly reliable for some 
countries fails to corroborate and falsifies the claim of faulty methodologies.  
If the claim of faulty methodologies were true, the CPI’s corruption scores 
would be problematic in each and every case.  However, this is not what our 
data analysis reveals.107
Table 6. Reliability of CPI. Correlations (sig.)
The Gambia
CPI CPI@T-1 CPI@T-2 CPI@T-3
CPI 1 .576
(.063)
.141
(.698)
-.266
(.488)
CPI@T-1 1 .577
(.081)
.126
(.748)
CPI@T-2 1 .577
(.081)
CPI@T-3 1
Moldova
CPI CPI@T-1 CPI@T-2 CPI@T-3
CPI 1 .494
(.061)
.338
(.237)
.327
(.276)
CPI@T-1 1 .412
(.143)
.193
(.528)
CPI@T-2 1 .412
(.143)
CPI@T-3 1
Russia
CPI CPI@T-1 CPI@T-2 CPI@T-3
CPI 1 .591 .119 -.406
106. Id. at 272.
107. Our argument takes the basic form of a modus tollendo tollens, such that: if the 
methodology was wrong, all the scores should be wrong/unreliable.  Some of the scores 
are not wrong/unreliable, and therefore the methodology is not wrong.
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(.020) (.686) (.168)
CPI@T-1 1 .555
(.039)
.018
(.953)
CPI@T-2 1 .555
(.039)
CPI@T-3 1
Uzbekistan
CPI CPI@T-1 CPI@T-2 CPI@T-3
CPI 1 .804
(.000)
.582
(.029)
.387
(.191)
CPI@T-1 1 .798
(.001)
.570
(.42)
CPI@T-2 1 .798
(.001)
CPI@T-3 1
Ghana
CPI CPI@T-1 CPI@T-2 CPI@T-3
CPI 1 .766
(.001)
.777
(.001)
.619
(.024)
CPI@T-1 1 .650
(.012)
.661
(.014)
CPI@T-2 1 .650
(.012)
CPI@T-3 1
Indonesia
CPI CPI@T-1 CPI@T-2 CPI@T-3
CPI 1 .977
(.000)
.969
(.000)
.981
(.000)
CPI@T-1 1 .972
(.000)
.961
(.000)
CPI@T-2 1 .972
(.000)
CPI@T-3 1
International measures of corruption are problematic in terms of validity 
and reliability.  However, the fact that in some cases, such as in Indonesia, 
CPI methodologies can generate both valid and reliable estimates suggests 
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 55 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 55 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
PELIZZO ET AL. FORMATTED (4-6-17) 6/28/2017 5:01 PM
2017 Objective or Perception-Based? 101
that the problem is not so much in the methodologies employed to generate 
such scores, but rather in the data or in the information that these 
methodologies process.
Our findings have three sets of implications.  First of all, they suggest 
that in most countries international measures fail to provide a proper 
indication of whether and to what extent corruption levels have changed over 
time and, as a result, should not be used to judge whether and to what extent 
anti-corruption policies were actually successful in curbing corruption.  
Second, our findings suggest that in order to be able to properly assess 
corruption levels and changes thereof, it is essential to rely on more than one 
measure.  Third, our findings suggest that analysts need to develop and/or get 
access to better, more reliable, and more precise data in order to generate 
good and credible estimates of corruption.  And because we know that in 
some cases, international measures of corruption have problems of validity 
while in other cases they have problems of reliability, some attention will 
have to be paid to why the data/information processed to generate corruption 
scores is not valid in some settings and not reliable in others.
VI. Measuring Corruption: Three Kazakhstani Solutions
In order to bypass both possible and documented problems, various 
Kazakhstani institutions have developed new methodologies to measure and 
track corruption.  In this section we review two such approaches. One 
approach is by the former Academy of Financial Police and attempts to 
measure corruption in objective terms. The second approach was developed 
by the NOPPI and attempts to measure the perceived level of corruption.
The first methodology, which is by the former Academy of Financial 
Police, is a new, objective measure of corruption and is estimated in the 
following way.108 First, the analyst must quantify the total number of 
employees in a given state body.109  This number, which is coded as “Po,”
indicates the total number of persons authorized to perform state functions.110
The second step is to identify and count the number of persons that have 
committed corruption-related crimes, the number of persons involved in 
administrative offences, and the number of people subjected to disciplinary 
measures and penalties for corruption-related activities.111 The number of 
people committing a corruption related crime is coded as “Ly,” the number 
of people committing administrative offense is coded as “La,” and the number 
of people subjected to disciplinary measures is coded as “Ld.”112
Since corruption related offenses are more serious or severe than 
administrative offenses and disciplinary matters, they receive a higher 
108. Sarkytbek Moldabayev, Former Rector, Acad. Fin. Police, Presentation at the 
Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Public Policy Workshop: Development of the 
National Corruption Perception Index (Apr. 1, 2015).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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coefficient.  Specifically, corruption crimes receive a score of 3, 
administrative offences receive a score of 2, and disciplinary matters receive 
a score of 1.113
After computing the percentage of corrupt individuals out of the total 
number of employees in a state body, the analyst multiplies these percentages 
by the coefficient.114 The analyst then computes the overall index of 
corruption for a given state body (“Pk”) by adding the three numbers 
generated in this way.
Table 7. Computation of Corruption Index of Public Institutions
State 
Authority?
Corruption Related 
Crimes?
Administrative Offenses? Disciplinary Matters?
Total 
Number of 
Employees?
Po?
Number of
Employees 
Committing 
Offenses?
Ly= number of 
employees 
committing a 
corruption related 
crime?
La=number of 
employees committing 
an administrative 
offense?
Ld= number of 
employees 
committing a 
disciplinary violation?
Percent of 
Corrupt 
Employees 
out of the 
Total 
Number of 
Employees?
Ky= (Ly/Po) x 100? Ka=(La/Po) x 100? Kd(Ld/Po) x 100?
Coefficient ? 3? 2? 1?
Corruption 
Score?
Pk = (Ky x 3) + (Ka x 2) + (Kd x 1)?
This formula can be used to calculate the level of corruption of several 
state bodies to identify which of them are more exposed to corruption or, for 
the sake of simplicity, more corrupt.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Table 8. Corruption in the Public Sector
Office of 
Public 
Prosecutor?
Ministry 
of 
Internal 
Affairs?
Judges? Armed 
Forces?
Customs? Tax 
Agency?
Financial 
Police?
Number of 
People who 
Committed 
a
Corruption-
related 
Crime?
3? 341? 15? 22? 60? 49? 7?
Number of 
Civil 
Servants?
5474? 103496? 2176? 83000? 6000? 8860? 3383?
Corruption 
Coefficient?
0.16? 1.25? 2.07? 0.08? 3.0? 1.66? 0.62?
The former Rector of the Financial Police Academy computed the level 
of corruption on the basis of data collected for 2013.  The evidence presented 
in Table 8, taken from the former Rector’s presentation, illustrates that the 
number of corruption offences ranges from 3 in the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor to 341 in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  Once we account for 
the number of employees in each of these bodies and we compute the level of 
corruption, we find that the corruption index ranges from 0.08 in the Armed 
Forces to 3.0 in Customs.  Specifically, the highest incidence of corruption is 
found in Customs, followed by the judiciary, the Tax Agency, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, the Financial Police, the Office of the Prosecutor, and 
finally, the Armed Forces.
By adding up the corruption scores for each sector, we find that the 
public sector for Kazakhstan in 2013 had an overall corruption coefficient of 
8.84.
By performing a similar analysis for the following years, the Academy 
of Financial Police believes that it will be able to precisely track not only the 
overall level of corruption in the country, to assess whether and to what extent 
anti-corruption measures introduced by the government are effective in 
curbing corruption, but will also be able to monitor how corruption varies
across sectors and over time.115
115. Id.
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On the other hand, the Public Policy Institute of the Nur Otan Party has 
adopted a rather different approach.  Instead of measuring corruption on the 
basis of objective measures, the party devised an index of perceived 
corruption, or, as it was tentatively called in the early stages of the project, 
the National Corruption Perception Index.116
This index is computed on the basis of survey data.  It can be used to 
assess the perceived level of corruption across regions and sectors and can 
eventually be employed to track variations in the level of corruption over 
time.117
The survey to collect the relevant information asks respondents to 
indicate: a) how much corruption they believe there is in the country/region, 
b) how much corruption they believe is in a variety of sectors, and c) how 
pervasive they believe various forms of corruption 
(nepotism/clientelism/favoritism; abuse of resources/embezzlement; and 
bribery) are.118
The first set of data indicates the perceived level of corruption across the 
Republic of Kazakhstan’s sixteen subnational units (fourteen regions and the 
cities of Astana and Almaty).  The second set of data indicates the perceived 
level of corruption across various sectors.  The third set of data indicates the 
pervasiveness of three distinct forms of corruption that closely resemble the 
indicators employed in the computation of the GCI.
After recoding the responses into five-point scales, the index is then 
computed based on the following root-mean-square formula and rescaled to 
a one-hundred-point scale:
???? ? ??????
??? ? ??? ? ???
?
X1 is the average of the responses concerning the level of corruption in 
the regions. X2 is the average of the responses on the level of corruption in 
the various sectors.  And X3 is the average of the responses on the incidence 
of three different forms of corruption.
116. Kseniya Voronina, National Corruption Perception Index will be developed in 
Kazakhstan, KAZPRAVDA (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.kazpravda.kz/rubric/obshchestvo/
metodologiu-natsionalnogo-indeksa-vospriyatiya-korruptsii-budet-sformirovan-v-ka/
[https://perma.cc/N32G-64MV]; Murat Zhakeyev, Development of the National 
Corruption Perception Index Raised Interest Among International Experts – S.Nurbek,
KAZINFORM (Apr. 2, 2015, 11:54 AM), http://www.inform.kz/rus/article/2761899 [https:/
/perma.cc/2G36-MD57].
117. The draft of the National Corruption Perception Index was launched in an 
international conference organized by the Nur Otan Party in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Culture and Sports on November 20, 2015.  The proceeding of that conference 
exists in the volume, Sbornik mejdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi 
konferencii: Pravovie osnovi i praktika protivodeistvia korruptsii: natsionalniy i 
mejdunarodniy opit [Legislative Basis and Practices of Fighting Corruption: National and 
International Experiences], which was organized by the Institute of Public Policy of the 
Nur Otan Party and the Ministry of Culture and Sports.
118. Id.
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It is impossible, at the moment, to say whether and to what extent the 
methodologies devised by the Academy of Financial Police and by the Nur 
Otan Public Policy Institute will generate better estimates in terms of validity 
and reliability than those generated by the international organizations.  
Nevertheless, it is a positive development for a country that is often criticized 
for allegedly having high levels of corruption because it demonstrates a
genuine commitment to estimating corruption, understanding its causes, 
identifying the areas in which corruption is more pervasive, and assessing the 
impact of the anti-corruption measures adopted by the government.  Even 
more remarkable is the fact that in a country generally not known for its 
pluralism, there has been a vibrant and theoretically informed, 
methodological debate and a plurality of perspectives on how corruption 
levels could and should be estimated.119
Conclusion
The most unambiguous conclusion of the present analysis is 
methodological: when the methodologies devised by international 
organizations such Transparency International or the World Bank are applied 
in the case of Kazakhstan to estimate the level of corruption in the country, 
the corruption estimates generated seem to provide a somewhat inadequate 
picture.  In fact, the estimates generated in this way are somewhat inconsistent 
with one another and seem to indicate major upward and downward swings 
in corruption levels that may not adequately capture the real level of 
corruption in Kazakhstan.  A second and, in our view, more important 
conclusion is that this analysis also identifies a previously neglected 
“explanation” for the failure of these estimates in assessing the proper level 
of corruption.  These estimates “fail” not because Kazakhstan is an exception 
or because the methodologies devised by international organizations are 
inherently problematic, but because the data they analyze to estimate 
corruption are, in the case of Kazakhstan but possibly in other cases as well, 
rather problematic.
Given the problems that international measures of corruption seem to 
encounter in the case of Kazakhstan and given the origin of such problems, 
several institutions in Kazakhstan have developed new approaches to 
estimating corruption.  The former Academy of Financial Police of 
Kazakhstan, using what was regarded as a “criminological” approach, created 
an index of corruption that is objective, or fact-based, in the sense that it infers 
the level of corruption of various sectors and subordinately of the whole set 
of government institutions from the incidence of criminal, administrative, and 
disciplinary sanctions punishing relevant violations.  The Public Policy 
Institute of the Nur Otan Party, Kazakhstan’s ruling party, using what the 
Academy regards as a “sociological” approach, created a National Corruption 
119. Voronina, supra note 116; see Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Genuine Pluralism 
Remains Elusive as Observers Slam Election, EURASIANET (Jan. 16, 2012, 12:03 PM), 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64845 [https://perma.cc/ES4N-VNYT].
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Perception Index to assess the incidence of various forms of corruption across 
regions and sectors and, subordinately, in the country as a whole.
There are at least four reasons why the methodological exercises 
undertaken by Kazakhstani institutions represent a positive development.  
First, they testify to the fact that Kazakhstani institutions are genuinely 
committed to studying, countering, and reducing corruption.  Second, since 
these methodologies are locally produced with locally collected data, there is 
every reason to believe that the data they employ are more precise than those 
utilized by international organizations to estimate corruption levels.  Third, 
the corruption levels estimated with the methodology devised by the former 
Academy of Financial Police and by the NOPPI could represent a valuable 
benchmark against which to test the validity of the international measures.  
Fourth, and in our view most importantly, the fact that Kazakhstani 
institutions have devised both fact-based (or objective) and perception-based 
(or subjective) measures of corruption will enable scholars and practitioners 
to explore whether and to what extent perceptions of corruption relate to or 
are affected by the real incidence of corruption.  By exploring whether 
variation (across sectors, regions, and time) is a function of changes in the 
objective level of corruption or whether such variation should be ascribed to 
other (cultural, cognitive, normative, etc.) factors, it will be possible to 
develop a better understanding of the factors responsible for the perception 
of corruption.  Such a contribution would be quite interesting not only for 
Kazakhstani policy makers, but also for a wide range of comparative politics 
specialists.
